













MPIfG Discussion Paper 20/13
From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering?
Contract, Status, and the Question of Consent
Ruth Dukes and Wolfgang Streeck
Ruth Dukes and Wolfgang Streeck 
From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? Contract, Status, and the Question of Consent
MPIfG Discussion Paper 20/13  
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne  
November 2020
MPIfG Discussion Paper 
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) 
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2020 by the authors
About the authors
Ruth Dukes is Professor of Labour Law at the University of Glasgow.
Email: ruth.dukes@glasgow.ac.uk
Wolfgang Streeck is a Senior Research Associate and Emeritus Director at the Max Planck Institute for the 
Study of Societies, Cologne.
Email: ws@mpifg.de
MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed 
disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl-
edge. Copies can be ordered from the Institute or downloaded as PDF files (free).
Downloads  
www.mpifg.de  
Go to Publications / Discussion Papers
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies  
Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany
Tel. +49 221 2767-0  
Fax +49 221 2767-555
www.mpifg.de  
info@mpifg.de
Dukes, Streeck: From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? iii
Abstract 
This paper revisits the notions of contract and status found in classical sociology, legal theory, and la-
bour law. Adopting an historical perspective, it explores the fragmentation of the status of industrial 
citizenship during the neoliberal period and discusses the enduring usefulness of the status/contract 
distinction in analyzing current trends in the regulation of working relations, including the spread 
of “gig” or platform-mediated work. Elements of status, it is argued, must always be present if work is 
to be performed and paid for as the parties require it. Claims to the contrary – for example, that the 
gig economy creates a labour market without search frictions and only minimal transaction costs: 
contracts without status – assume an undersocialized model of (monadic) social action that has no 
basis in the reality of social life (Durkheim, Weber). Still, status may come in a variety of forms that 
are more or less desirable from the perspective of workers, businesses, and society at large. The paper 
traces what it conceives as the privatization of status via contracts between employers and workers 
under the pressure of marketization and dominated by corporate hierarchies. Towards the end of the 
twentieth century, sociologists observed the division of workers into two groups or classes – core 
(with relatively well-paid and secure employment) and peripheral (low-paid and insecure). Thirty 
years later, gross inequalities of wealth and conceptions of the neoliberal self as ever-improving, ever-
perfectible, are combining to create novel forms of status not fully anticipated by the literature.
Keywords: contract and status, corporatism, entrepreneurialism, gig economy, industrial citizenship, 
industrial democracy, master and servant, precarity
Zusammenfassung
Wir beginnen mit einem Rückblick auf zwei Begriffe, Vertrag und Status, die in der klassischen So-
ziologie, in der Rechtstheorie und im Arbeitsrecht eine prominente Rolle spielen. In einer histori-
schen Perspektive untersuchen wir die Fragmentierung des auf industrielle Bürgerrechte gegrün-
deten Arbeitnehmerstatus in der neoliberalen Periode und betonen den bleibenden Nutzen der 
Unterscheidung zwischen Status und Vertrag für die Analyse gegenwärtiger Entwicklungen in der 
Regulierung von Arbeitsbeziehungen, einschließlich der Ausbreitung von sogenannter Gig-Arbeit 
und durch Plattformen vermittelter Dienstleistungen. Unser Argument ist, dass Elemente von Status 
präsent sein müssen, wo immer Arbeit so geleistet und bezahlt werden soll, wie zwischen den Ver-
tragsparteien vereinbart. Vorstellungen wie die, dass die Gig-Ökonomie einen Arbeitsmarkt ohne 
Suchkosten und mit nur minimalen Transaktionskosten hervorbringt – Vertrag ohne Status –, unter-
stellen ein untersozialisiertes Modell (monadischen) sozialen Handelns, das keine Grundlage in der 
Wirklichkeit des sozialen Lebens hat (Durkheim, Weber). Allerdings kann Status eine Vielzahl von 
Formen annehmen, die aus der Perspektive von Beschäftigern, Beschäftigten und der Gesellschaft als 
Ganzes mehr oder weniger wünschenswert sind. Das Papier verfolgt den Prozess der Privatisierung 
von Status mittels Vertrag unter dem Druck des Marktes und der Macht von Unternehmenshierar-
chien. Gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts beobachteten Soziologen eine Spaltung der Arbeiterschaft 
in zwei Gruppen oder Klassen, die eine im Kern (mit relativ guter Bezahlung und vergleichsweise 
hoher Beschäftigungssicherheit) und die andere an der Peripherie (schlecht bezahlt und prekär) des 
Beschäftigungssystems. Drei Jahrzehnte später verbinden sich krasse wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit 
und Vorstellungen von einem in ständiger Verbesserung und Perfektionierung begriffenen neolibe-
ralen Selbst in der Schaffung neuer, von der Literatur nicht antizipierter Formen von vertragsbasier-
tem Status.
Schlagwörter: Gig Economy, industrielle Bürgerrechte, industrielle Demokratie, Korporatismus, 
master and servant, Prekarität, Unternehmertum, Vertrag und Status
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From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? Contract, 
Status, and the Question of Consent
1 Introduction
Whatever became of industrial citizenship? Once upon a time, when its heyday was 
already coming to an end, it was described as a peculiar configuration of status and 
contract. In the first part of this paper we revisit an essay written in 1986 by one of the 
authors, entitled “Status and Contract as Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of 
Industrial Relations” (hereinafter “Status and Contract”).1 By returning to what now 
seems like the distant past, to an era still widely considered to have been the Golden 
Age of labour law and politics, we hope to learn about the present in the light of how and 
why it differs, and came to differ, from that time.2 
We begin in section 2 (“Status and contract in the age of industrial citizenship”) by 
reconsidering central concepts from the 1986 essay, preparing the ground for an as-
sessment of their capacity to capture the profound changes that have taken place and 
continue to take place today. Concepts, as Philip Selznick reminds us, are “open-ended, 
subject to debate and revision, accessible to empirical judgment” (Selznick 1969, 4); 
they are time-bound, carrying different meanings in different historical contexts. In 
1986, status was defined with reference to both classical sociology and postwar industri-
al relations scholarship as a necessary supplement to contract, both generally speaking 
and in the particular context of working relations. Contracts for the exchange of work 
for wages, it was noted, are typically agreed by parties of unequal bargaining power and, 
in respect of the specification of the obligations of the worker, incomplete; status fills 
in the gaps, securing in one way or another the worker’s consent to work as the em-
This project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 757395). We are 
grateful to Aude Cefaliello and Rex Panneman for research assistance.
1 The essay was Streeck’s Habilitation lecture at the University of Bielefeld in 1986. In written form 
it appeared first in 1988 as “Status und Kontrakt als Grundkategorien einer Theorie der indus-
triellen Beziehungen”, Discussion Paper SP-LMP, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. An extended 
English version was published two years later: Wolfgang Streeck. 1990. “Status and Contract 
as Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of Industrial Relations.” In Regulating Corporate 
Groups in Europe, edited by David Sugarman and Gunther Teubner, 105–45. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. Lightly revised, it was included in Wolfgang Streeck. 1992. Social Institutions and Eco-
nomic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies. London 
and Beverly Hills: Sage, 41–75. Further references are to this last version. 
2 As in Streeck’s original paper, our focus lies with the now post-industrial nations of the global 
north, which share a history of industrial democracy. In places, we use terminology that is spe-
cific to Anglo-American legal systems (e. g., the law of master and servant) in the knowledge that 
equivalents are found elsewhere and that the arguments made are therefore of wider application.
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ployer wishes and directs her to do. The primary focus of the essay lay with industrial 
citizenship as providing a particular, democratic foundation for workers’ consent. As 
globalization progressed and neoliberalism took hold, so it went on to observe (section 
3, “The neoliberal turn: Flexibility versus justice”), the fracturing of postwar industrial 
relations and labour law gave rise to what it called a “polarization of status and contract”, 
and a resultant dualism, comprising a core of workers with job security and employ-
ment rights, and a periphery of casualized and highly precarious labour. The essay con-
cluded by considering the implications of dualism for economic productivity and social 
stability: how could these be achieved if employment relations was increasingly a realm 
of private ordering rather than industrial democracy?
In the fourth section of this paper, subtitled “Liberalization as emancipation?”, we sug-
gest that hindsight reveals a slightly different picture to the one painted in the 1980s. In 
charting a progression from contract to the particular status of industrial citizenship, 
the “Status and Contract” paper tended to obscure the inherent attraction of contract 
to workers as an emancipatory mechanism, freeing them from a servile status and a 
relation of service to their “master” – or indeed, from what might be perceived as the 
overregulated and stultifying routine of the Fordist industrial citizen. Industrial rela-
tions scholarship tended also to overestimate the attractions of industrial citizenship 
for employers: the economic benefit that they could secure by conceding employment 
rights to their workers, including rights to collective representation and participation in 
managerial decision-making. Especially in the expanding services sector, and with the 
help of developments in technology, it now appears increasingly possible to organize 
work in a manner that ensures managerial control without creating significant oppor-
tunities for workers to sabotage the labour process, thereby unburdening employers of 
the need to secure workers’ good will. 
In section 5 (“Four workers, peripheral and core”), an empirical examination of con-
temporary contracts for work expands upon and confirms these points. Notwithstand-
ing the great variety of forms of contract for work and associated status around today, 
two trends are observable. In the case of peripheral workers hired on casual or even 
“spot” contracts, status does not disappear entirely, rather the relationship tends to as-
sume a master-and-servant-like form with economic compulsion and new technologies 
used, in addition to and in combination with law, to secure the workers’ consent. For 
both core and peripheral workers, meanwhile, self-employment and entrepreneurship 
have a new prominence in employment relations, holding a promise of freedom and 
autonomy which, for the vast majority, is not borne out by the realities of working life. 
Where the notion of entrepreneurship is internalized by the worker, consent to manage-
rial direction may be given freely as likely to enhance her standing and marketability. In 
a final section (“Contract, status, and post-industrial justice”), we consider the extent 
and the limits of private ordering in employment relations today. An examination of the 
role of the state and of workers themselves in tolerating or facilitating private ordering 
by employing organizations provides some preliminary indications of how to address 
anew questions of industrial citizenship and justice at work. 
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2 Status and contract in the age of industrial citizenship
“Status and Contract” was written at a time when the postwar social compact of which 
national industrial relations systems formed a part was beginning to disintegrate. The 
ascent of Reagan and Thatcher to power figured here as both cause and manifestation. 
What was not clear was how far the disintegration process would go, exactly where it 
was heading, and whether it could and should be halted or even reversed by institution-
al reform. The emerging neoliberalism for which Reagan and Thatcher stood had been 
a reaction, among other things, to the global industrial unrest of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In the course of that unrest, the institutions of industrial relations in the capitalist 
democracies of the “West” came under pressure from two sides: from militant workers 
whose self-confidence was enhanced by apparently securely institutionalized rights of 
industrial citizenship, and from employers and governments who, for partly different 
reasons, felt that such rights were being used irresponsibly or had been allowed to de-
velop too far, undermining the capitalist economy and the liberal-democratic polity. 
Intense discussions ensued, in politics and the academy, which revealed an underlying 
tension between industrial peace and social progress as institutionalized objectives in 
industrial relations, represented by different actors and diverse theoretical approaches. 
At some point this called for a re-examination of the conceptual foundations and the 
historical trajectories of industrial relations theory and practice; like the Owl of Mi-
nerva spreading its wings, however, the ensuing re-examination reached its climax just 
as the social arrangements in question began to dissolve.
Aligning itself with the social progress side of the debate, “Status and Contract” drew 
in the first instance on nineteenth-century theoretical reflections in sociology and law 
concerning the limited capacity of a liberal order to provide for social integration, con-
stituted as it was by voluntary contractual relations between independent, autonomous 
individuals. In sociology, authors as diverse as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber were of the 
view that, in particular, relations between owners of capital and sellers of labour meeting 
in the newly instituted “labour markets” were so deeply distorted by differences in power, 
deriving from differences in need and urgency, that they could only give rise to unequal 
contracts. Formally voluntary agreements, these were in fact dictates by the stronger to 
the weaker party. As such they lacked the normative justification expected by liberal the-
orists, such as Maine and Spencer, to flow from the parties’ exercise of “free will” in enter-
ing into their relationships.3 Unless something was done, modern society was therefore 
threatened by disruptive conflicts especially at its very core – modern industry – where 
its material life and, presumably, growing prosperity were to be produced.
3 The paper quoted Max Weber, according to whom “the formal right of a worker to enter into any 
contract whatsoever with any employer whatsoever does not in practice represent for the em-
ployment seeker even the slightest freedom in the determination of his own conditions of work 
… It rather means, at least primarily, that the more powerful party in the market, i. e., normally 
the employer, has the possibility to set the terms, to offer the job ‘take it or leave it’, and, given 
the normally more pressing economic need of the worker, to impose his terms on him” (Weber 
[1922] 1978, 729–30).
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In its dual concern with economic productivity and social stability – both inherited from 
the classical tradition and reflective of then current politics – the “Status and Contract” 
paper was characteristic of the industrial relations literature of the time. In two respects, 
the paper suggested, contract as such was rightly considered to be unable to pacify the 
relationship between capital and labour. This was so in the market, where employers 
seeking to hire labour could afford to wait, and so to force unemployed workers, in more 
urgent need of employment, to submit to the conditions offered to them, both exploit-
ing and adding to economic inequality. It also applied, secondly, at the workplace where 
the contract, entered into by ostensibly free and equal partners, gave rise to a one-sided 
relationship of authority – and had to, given the inevitably incomplete job description in 
a contract written in and for a technologically and economically dynamic economy. In-
dustrial relations, then, the subject of the original essay’s theoretical effort, was conceived 
as the building and maintenance of essentially public institutions capable of healing the 
deficiencies of the private contract as a foundation for productive class cooperation. 
It is here that the second main concept of the paper came into play: status. Retracing 
the social-theoretical tradition, status was defined as “a complex of rights and duties 
imposed on individuals a priori as a consequence of their belonging to a particular social 
category  …” (43), or, with Weber, as a “starting point for (an individual‘s) further legally 
relevant activities”, more generally as “a special and intrinsic quality (that) is attributed to 
him by the law independently of his own acts of consociation”.4 As such, status could be 
treated as an institution that was part of what Durkheim, in his Division of Labour (1893), 
summarily described as the “non-contractual conditions of contract”: the conditions 
which underpinned and made viable contractual relations, given that contract-pure-and-
simple could not hold a society together.5 Following the classical tradition, then, status 
was understood to designate an institution above or below, in any case beyond individual 
volition – in other words, a public institution. Contract, in contrast, was the institution 
that allowed individuals to arrange their mutual relations as they pleased, provided that 
their chosen arrangement remained within the limits drawn for them by their respective 
statuses. In the functionalist-cum-political perspective of the postwar era, the politics of 
industrial relations consisted in the construction of status rights and obligations suitable 
to repair the deficiencies of contract as a medium of social integration – the objective 
4 As cited on p. 43 (Weber [1922] 1978, 669). Writing in the later twentieth century, Otto Kahn-
Freund conceived of the contract of employment as the “general foundation” of the service or 
employment relation: from a legal perspective, there was no master and servant, or employer/
employee, relation until the contract had been agreed (Kahn-Freund 1977). The status of citizen, 
in contrast, is logically prior to contract. Citizenship permits a person to enter a market and 
conclude a contract, as captured by T. H. Marshall’s concept of “civil rights” in his famous essay 
of 1949 (Marshall 1965).
5 “If mutual interest draws men closer, it is never more than for a few moments … Indeed, if we 
look to the heart of the matter we shall see that every harmony of interests conceals a latent 
conflict, or one that is simply deferred … Self-interest is, in fact, the least constant thing in the 
world. Today it is useful for me to unite with you; tomorrow the same reason will make me your 
enemy …” (Durkheim [1893] 1964, 152). Similarly Weber, for whom a purely interest-based 
social order critically lacks stability.
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being that contracts for work could and would be formed in a way that allowed them to 
be perceived as equitable and therefore just, in particular by the weaker party. In both 
the labour market and the workplace or firm, the task of the political institutionalization 
of industrial relations, including labour law, as a high art of class compromise if not rec-
onciliation was to limit the freedom of contract of buyers and sellers of labour through 
the imposition of a modern, politically constructed status. As T. H. Marshall put it in 
his seminal account of the welfare state as a product of an evolving hierarchy of rights, 
the modern status in question was, specifically, industrial citizenship (Marshall 1965).6 
Whereas in pre-modern times, working relations had been determined by the parties’ 
status as master and servant, industrial citizenship had as its paradigm the relationship 
between citizens in a democracy, egalitarian rather than hierarchical. 
In the 1986 paper, status-building to facilitate the conclusion and performance of con-
tracts for work was discussed separately with respect to workplaces and labour markets, 
drawing in the first instance on the then influential work of Alan Fox concerning the 
presumed dysfunctions of Fordist-Taylorist work organization (Fox 1974).7 In the post-
war decades, institutionalists, as they were then called, considered the undergirding of 
private contract by public status as essential for social justice, social justice as essential 
for social peace, and social peace as essential for industrial performance. As to how to 
achieve such undergirding there was, however, disagreement, especially in the 1960s 
and 1970s in the light of contemporary conflicts over industrial relations and its “re-
form”. With the growing intensity of industrial conflict, a left wing of industrial relations 
reformists lost their faith in the desirability of integrative institutions. With an old or 
new allegiance to a class-theoretical view of society, which in the case of Alan Fox re-
6 Thomas H. Marshall. 1965. Citizenship and Social Class. In Class, Citizenship, and Social Devel-
opment: Essays by T. H. Marshall. Garden City: Anchor Books, 71–134. Industrial citizenship as 
a concept is not particularly prominent in Marshall’s exposition. It is introduced as something 
like an intermediate solution for the creation of social rights before the advent of the “Planned 
Society and the Welfare State” (102), as an improvised expedient before the full accomplish-
ment of democracy and, with it, an interventionist modern state (122). According to Marshall, 
collective bargaining “meant that social progress was being sought by strengthening civil rights, 
not by creating social rights; through the use of contract in the open market, not through a 
minimum wage and social security” (103). Its significance lay in the fact that it amounted to 
an “extension of civil rights in the economic sphere”, making it “an instrument [for the work-
ers] for raising their social and economic status, that is to say, for establishing the claim that 
they, as citizens, were entitled to certain social rights” (103). Collective bargaining amounted 
to “the transfer of an important process from the political to the civil sphere of citizenship”, at 
a time when workers “either did not possess, or had not yet learned to use, the political right of 
the franchise” – which they now, as Marshall was writing, had obtained. “Trade unionism has, 
therefore, created a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel with and supplementary 
to the system of political citizenship” (103–4). In the present paper we use the concept of indus-
trial citizenship in a somewhat broader sense, to refer to the entirety of “status” rights instituted 
to neutralize the market power differential between workers and employers in that they enable 
them to negotiate collective contracts, or agreements, on a level playing field, allowing workers 
to say no to offers they deem unacceptable. 
7 Alan Fox. 1974. Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: Faber and Faber.
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sulted in his departure from the “Oxford School”,8 they now considered as an historical 
possibility nothing less than the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, brought about 
by contract insufficiently redeemed by status. Focusing on work organization and the 
need for mutual trust across hierarchical levels, Fox and others maintained not only 
that modern politicized status had been unable to supplant the feudal legacy of master 
and servant, but that without that legacy it would be unable to do its job: to guarantee 
the smooth operation of a hierarchical workplace organization. With its paternalistic 
implications, however, feudal status was subject to erosion by management insisting on 
its right to manage, if need be against workers’ wishes, and by workers and unions in-
sisting in turn on ever more specific, detailed, rigid circumscription of their rights and 
the duties of management, precisely to remove the last remnants of the master/servant 
tradition. According to Fox, these dynamics were bound to set in motion a “spiral of low 
trust”, driven by an underlying fundamental class conflict that was incurable by even 
the most sophisticated of institutional stopgaps.
Similar considerations arose in respect of labour markets, as observed in particular by 
Tannenbaum and Marshall commenting on the role of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining in industrial democracies (Tannenbaum 1964). Already Marshall had won-
dered how institutionally empowered trade unions could be made to act “responsibly” 
– defining and defending their interests under industrial citizenship so as not to kill but 
rather feed and fondle the capitalist goose laying golden eggs, supposedly, not just for 
them but for society as a whole.9 Contracting for work was to be pacified by balancing 
the secular move from status to contract by a secular countermove from contract to 
status, in the form of a legal right for workers to collective bargaining, politicizing the 
contract by collectivizing it. Reconciling this with a Keynesian responsibility for the 
government to provide for full employment turned out to be difficult, however, since 
full employment created opportunities for collective opportunism on the side of unions, 
as perceived by British and other governments in the 1960s and 1970s.10 In fact it was 
8 On the “Oxford School” see George Bain, “Oxford School of Industrial Relations: Fifty Years 
after Donovan”, Nuffield College, Oxford, 24 October 2015, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/
docs/uploads/george-bain-reading-on-oxford-school-of-industrial-relations.pdf, last seen on 4 
November 2020. On Fox see his Beyond Contract.
9 “If citizenship is invoked in the defense of rights, the corresponding duties of citizenship cannot 
be ignored … [They] require … a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the commu-
nity. Trade union leaders in general accept this implication, but this is not true of all members of 
the rank and file … Unofficial strikes have become very frequent, and it is clear that one impor-
tant element in industrial disputes is discord between trade union leaders and sections of trade 
union members. Now duties can derive either from status or from contract. Leaders of unofficial 
strikes are liable to reject both …” etc., etc. (Marshall 1965, 123). Obviously this anticipates the 
central themes of the industrial relations “reform” debates of the 1960s and 1970s. 
10 This had been anticipated by Keynes as early as the 1920s. Keynes’s attitude toward trade unions 
was always ambivalent. On the one hand they were useful as in a business downturn they pro-
tected demand by making wages “sticky”. On the other hand this could exacerbate unemploy-
ment, which would require some sort of government intervention, including of a punitive kind. 
Trade unions could also cause inflation by forcing wage increases above the increase in produc-
tivity, which was possible especially where government guaranteed full employment. In such 
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widely taken for granted at the time that it had been the political guarantee of full em-
ployment that had led to the strike waves, the overshooting wage settlements and the 
rising rates of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s – the very developments that had in turn 
caused the re-thinking of industrial relations and labour law and the demand for indus-
trial relations reform that we are here discussing. Worker “bloody-mindedness” – the 
opportunistic use of politically provided opportunities for “excessive” wage increases – 
was considered by “bourgeois” economists to be economically stupid and by left sociol-
ogists as retaliation for being locked into a proletarian existence, or simply a replication 
of observed capitalist behaviour. As early as 1944 Marshall had been of the view that the 
main burden in the restructuring of society to advance social justice should be borne 
by government and by social policy, in response to social rights grown out of political 
rights, with collective bargaining relegated to the back seat (Marshall 1965, 105–26). 
The 1970s and 1980s, then, was high time for debates on “incomes policy”: how to get 
trade unions to behave “responsibly” even when, in the absence of either legal sanctions 
under “free collective bargaining” or the economic threat of unemployment, they didn’t 
have to do so (Ulman and Flanagan 1971).11 
Extracting wage restraint from politically empowered trade unions posed difficult prob-
lems of institutional design that were at the centre of contemporary discussions on in-
dustrial relations reform. In the postwar era governments had made contracting for 
work acceptable to workers by establishing a set of status-generating institutions that 
applied irrespective of market conditions to all citizens who sought or were in employ-
ment – a catalogue of rights written by public policy into private contracts, comple-
menting and, if necessary, overriding what parties had agreed, to be monitored and 
enforced by the state. In the 1950s, this notion of inalienable worker rights before and 
beyond contract and protected from managerial discretion, constituted by legislation or 
collective bargaining, became the basis of the concept of an “industrial relations system”, 
as famously developed in the United States by politically influential academics like John 
Dunlop and Clark Kerr.12 Conceived as a subsystem of society in the sense of Parsonian 
structural-functionalism, separate from and on the same plane as the economic sys-
tem, the industrial relations system was supposed to function with relative autonomy, 
according to a logic and to social values of its own that had to be respected by all par-
ties in the labour market, especially the economically stronger (Parsons 1951).13 At the 
same time, it had to be able to do its duty: to contribute to the governability of capitalist 
society and, in particular, the state-administered capitalism of the time (Brown 2015).
instances Keynes advocated pragmatic political remedies, ranging from informal negotiations 
with trade union leaders (“moral suasion”) to more or less hard institutional limitations on free 
collective bargaining. 
11 See also, among many others, Robert Boyer, Ronald Dore, and Zoe Mars, eds. 1994. The Return 
to Incomes Policy. London: Francis Pinter.
12 See Dunlop (1958) 1993; Kerr 1960.
13 Talcott Parsons. 1951. The Social System. New York: The Free Press.
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At this point yet another bipolar distinction appears in the “Status and Contract” paper, 
namely that between pluralism and corporatism. Pluralism denotes a capital-labour re-
lationship where the class interests of either side are independently institutionalized as 
equally legitimate: the social interests of workers and the economic interests of employ-
ers, the rights of workers and management existing side by side, mutually undiluted, 
their conflict contained by procedural rules protecting the interests of society at large. 
While unions fight for wages and conditions, employers fight for productivity and prof-
itability, both by right, and the government ensures that the fight does not excessively 
disrupt social peace and industrial cooperation. Institutionalized industrial relations, 
involving labour, capital, and the state, are to produce a “web of rules” for the conflic-
tual interaction between interest-conscious workers and interest-conscious employers, 
one that stabilizes their relationship and protects both from fluctuations of markets and 
market power (Dunlop [1958] 1993). Pluralism in this sense de-economizes industrial 
relations, forcing employers to put up with a “pervasive moral indifference [on the part 
of] workforces to the firm’s economic goals” and a corresponding “shift of [worker] 
loyalties toward the unions” (57). In practice this implied acceptance by workers and 
unions of the Taylorist organization of work, specifically designed to function “at arm’s 
length”, regardless of whether workers identified with their work or cared about their 
place of employment. It also implied acceptance by employers of hard bargaining, with 
their workplace conflicts settled not by appeals to shared values, such as company or 
national patriotism, but by a sober assessment of the two sides’ conflicting interests and 
conjuncturally shifting power relations. 
Corporatism, in turn, was seen as an alternative to pluralism, or as an improved follow-
up model, upon which some of the anti-neoliberal, or pre-neoliberal, industrial rela-
tions reformists of the 1980s placed great hopes. For present purposes, corporatism 
may be defined as another variant of public status underpinning private contracting 
for work, both in labour markets and in the governance of work at the point of produc-
tion. Unlike pluralism, it pulls workers into management and unions into the state, as 
co-responsible co-agents on the inside of the firm and of government. In this way it 
promises to integrate worker interests in high wages and secure employment with busi-
ness interests in economic productivity and state interests in political stability. In some 
quarters, corporatism – or more precisely, the neo-corporatist corporatism of postwar 
Western democracies – has always been mistrusted as a disguised form of paternal-
ism, of cooptation of trade unions into capitalism, as a thin veiling of corruption and 
class betrayal if not fascism.14 Its defenders, in contrast, understood it to be an impor-
14 Strangely enough this view was widely held in a country like Sweden, which for many was a 
model case of democratic corporatism. Walter Korpi in his seminal analyses of the Swedish po-
litical economy held that it was “power resources”, not institutions, that accounted for Sweden’s 
peaceful march into socialism. That Sweden had almost no strikes at the time Korpi explained 
by the capacity of the two arms of the labour movement, the unions and the social-democratic 
party, to get their demands through without having to resort to conflict. That Germany, which 
he did consider corporatist, had equally low strike rates was explained, not by the institution of 
codetermination on company boards and at the workplace, but by the submissiveness of Ger-
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tant step in the organized working class’s advance towards the commanding heights of 
the economy, via worker participation or codetermination, and of the democratic state, 
where trade unions, in their “conflictual partnership” with capital,15 formed something 
like a “second tier of government”,16 indispensable, if properly institutionalized, to the 
proper functioning of the first tier. Taking their cues from countries like Sweden and, 
to an extent, Germany, neo-corporatists understood the concession of corporatist sta-
tus to workers and unions to be the price – a high price to be sure – that capital had 
to pay in “political exchange” for the cooperation of labour in the pursuit of increased 
productivity, secure profitability, and monetary stability; goals that assumed particular 
importance in the face of rising international competition (Pizzorno 1978).
A corporatist transformation of pluralist industrial relations was the last expedient of 
social-democratic labour politics, peddled to capital and governments alike as the right 
(and only) European, or indeed Western, response to what was then seen as the “Japa-
nese model” (Dore 1973). In contrast to Japanese-style enterprise unionism, class cor-
poratism was supposed to even out inequalities not just within the working class but 
also between labour and capital, in line with egalitarian values. Adherence to these 
was argued to be essential not just for democracy but also for industry, in that it and it 
alone would restore a cooperative spirit among workers without which advanced capi-
talism either couldn’t function at all, or could function only with inferior results. In 
fact, egalitarian values were upheld longer than elsewhere in countries that conformed 
to some extent to the democratic-corporatist model of industrial relations, renewing 
expectations that economic efficiency and social justice might be mutually conducive. 
Where it had proved impossible, during the 1970s and 1980s, to move from pluralism 
to either corporatism (or, for that matter, socialism), as for example in the UK and the 
US, the transition to neoliberalism began earlier, before the issue of status and contract 
took an entirely new turn in the 1990s, with the rapid progress of internationalization 
and globalization.17
man workers inherited from the fascist past. See Walter Korpi. 1978. The Working Class in Wel-
fare Capitalism: Work, Unions, and Politics in Sweden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Walter 
Korpi. 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
15 See Walther Müller-Jentsch. 2007. Strukturwandel der industriellen Beziehungen: “Industrial 
Citizenship” zwischen Markt und Regulierung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
16 The concept is from Stein Rokkan. 1966. “Norway. Numerical Democracy and Corporate Plu-
ralism.” In Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, edited by Robert A. Dahl, 70–115. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
17 In the UK, the Bullock Committee of 1977 failed to convince employers and lawmakers of the 
benefits of legally institutionalized worker participation; as did the Dunlop Commission in the 
US in the early 1990s. Jim Phillips. 2011. “UK Business Power and Opposition to the Bullock 
Committee’s 1977 Proposals on Worker Directors.” Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 31 
(2): 1–30.
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3 The neoliberal turn: Flexibility versus justice
In its final section, the “Status and Contract” paper considered the relationship between 
“justice and flexibility”, as it put it, in the context of “the neoliberal depoliticization of 
status and the limits to private order” (64). Much of the discussion was framed in terms 
of the “competitiveness” of Western economies – or more precisely, Western manufac-
turing – relative to Japan and its “production model”, then seen as superior. Given the 
political nature of modern status embedded in national, and nationally different, indus-
trial relations regimes, this perspective appeared natural at the time. A dominant con-
cern was that firms that had the parameters of their employment practices set for them 
externally, standardized at national level by politics or a pluralist nation-wide industrial 
relations system, were unable to match the performance in global markets of competi-
tors allowed by a committed workforce or by national laws flexibly to adjust to changing 
economic and technological conditions. Pressures for adaptation were mounting and 
were seen by many as threatening to abolish industrial relations “as an autonomous 
area of action decoupled from the overall strategy of the firm” (65). The questions were 
posed: what would succeed “the specific balance between status and contract that had 
been underlying the Fordist-Keynesian mode of regulation” (66); how much of that bal-
ance would and could be preserved by political reform; and how would the new regime 
differ from the old, especially with respect to the way contracts for work were to be 
completed or underpinned, if at all, by some kind of status?
By the 1990s at the latest, the principal concern in industrial relations was no longer to 
accommodate, or to exploit for progressive reform, the worker militancy of the 1970s, 
but rather how to adjust the capitalist economy of the “West” to global competition. In 
this context, the “Status and Contract” paper observed what it described as a “polar-
ization” of industrial relations systems “in two opposite directions: ‘back’ to an over-
whelmingly contractual and ‘forward’ to a primarily status-determined order” (66). 
This was meant in several ways. There was, first, a suggestion that different national 
systems might be differently affected by de-unionization leading to less status and more 
contract: “corporatist” Sweden and Germany less so than “pluralist” Britain and the 
United States. There was also the suggestion that corporatist systems, regardless of their 
relatively stable trade unions, might become more internally fragmented, due to diverg-
ing economic and technological conditions making encompassing class organization 
and regulation at the national level more difficult. More generally, a distinction was sug-
gested between systems that sought to increase competitiveness through “a reduction of 
status rights accompanied by an extension of contractual obligations”, and systems that 
aimed at “an extension of status obligations [of workers] in exchange for the protection 
or new creation of status (-like) rights [also] of workers” (66). Both approaches were 
regarded as attempts to restore flexibility through “renewed linkage of workers to the 
economic fate of the firm”. The better understood approach, the paper suggested, was 
the first, “neo-liberal” one, described as implying “intensified recourse to short-term, 
(status-) ‘free’ labour contracts as a means towards the quantitative and qualitative ad-
aptation of workforces.” “Status”, the paper continued, “survives in this variant at most 
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in its traditional form as a moral obligation of obedience, the importance of which for 
the stability of a neo-liberal contractual order is, however, probably slight compared to 
the compulsion of economic circumstances under high unemployment” (66).
The alternative path to “competitiveness”, said to be less well understood, was described 
as encompassing a variety of forms of internal labour markets “with high security of 
employment, the adaptive capacity of which is guaranteed by increased internal flex-
ibility” (66). Looming in the background was, again, the so-called Japanese model and 
the seminal work of Ronald Dore, who had identified “internal flexibility plus external 
rigidity on the basis of status-like employment” as “a functional equivalent to external 
flexibility plus, unavoidable in this case, high internal rigidity” (66).18 Promises of long-
term if not lifetime employment for some, de facto if not de jure, were set against short-
time employment-at-will, based on contract-pure-and-simple, as conceded by weak-
ened trade unions and condoned if not sponsored by governments concerned about 
unemployment, overburdened social security systems, low investment and, of course, 
national competitiveness. 
The contrast between status-based and contract-based employment was understood to 
distinguish between corporatist and plurality-liberal countries, but also between sec-
tors within countries, firms within sectors, and groups of workers within firms. Status 
had become, as it were, privatized: a matter of choice for human resource management 
rather than an external condition imposed upon employers and workers, as employers 
and workers, through politics, collective bargaining, and the law. Where the different 
status-and-contract configurations occurred in the same country and even the same 
firm, the concept that seemed most fitting was “dualism”, appropriated from earlier lit-
erature on industrial organization (Berger and Piore 1980). For industrial relations, the 
notion of dualism was used influentially by John Goldthorpe to distinguish between 
two types of national industrial relations systems, corporatist and dualist (Goldthorpe 
1984). The latter had corporatist elements in its economic “core”, supported and made 
possible by flexible spot-market contracting at its “periphery”. The former was charac-
terized by a generally corporatist order supported and instituted politically and, one 
should add, at risk of gradually turning dualist under the pressure of business and po-
litical interests in competitiveness and profitability. 
As it emerged in the 1980s at the beginning of the neoliberal revolution, the notion of a 
polarization of status and contract raised two conceptual issues that were both touched 
upon but, from today’s perspective, not satisfactorily addressed. What is status like, and 
what can it achieve, if it does not take the form of industrial citizenship? Secondly, what 
is contract like if it is not based in status, and can it nevertheless perform the function 
of constituting and regulating stable employment relations? As to the former, it was ar-
gued in 1986 that in a dualist context, status ceases to be “a mechanism of political redis-
18 Referring to Ronald Dore. 1986. Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment 
in the Japanese Economy 1970–80. London: Athlone.
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tribution, and turns into an individual right of private property”, no longer “against but 
within market and contract … an outcome of interest-led individual action and without 
recourse to either (re-) distributional politics or residues of feudal status” (68). As to the 
latter, transaction cost economics seemed to offer the prospect of successful voluntary, 
contractual, market-driven status-building through institution-building, depending on 
the nature of the labour services being traded.19 Where these were transaction-specific, 
or idiosyncratic, requiring long-term investment making the parties vulnerable to each 
other’s “opportunism with guile”, the two sides would devise specific mechanisms of 
“governance” to stabilize their interaction and cooperation. If they regulated their mu-
tual rights and obligations through “contracting in its entirety”, they might construct a 
private but nevertheless stable order out of rational self-interest, customized for their 
particular needs and purposes. All contracts, or at least the contracts that matter, are by 
their nature relational; they must only be explicitly drafted so as to reflect the interests 
of both sides – a job to be performed, presumably, by experts in contract law.20 
Both versions of this status-based-in-contract – status as private property or status as 
private government – depoliticize the regulation of contracting for work by turning 
it into a primarily private affair. Labour law gives way to contract law and mandatory 
institutions to voluntary agreement – spot-market contracting included if the parties 
to “contracting in its entirety” wish it. One consequence foreseen in the “Status and 
Contract” paper was the end of any comprehensive ordering of the labour market. In its 
place the paper envisaged a “multiplicity of the most diverse contractual forms and con-
tents” (70), extending from a transformation of firms into “closed moral status commu-
nities” to a “disintegration of company hierarchies in favor of market- and contract-type 
supply relationships between autonomous ‘profit centers’ or even firms”. Where highly 
specific assets were at stake, it was observed that, in the absence of community-type 
social integration, “the labour contract seems to lose its special features and become 
increasingly subject to the same laws as any supply or service contract – into which it 
often turns also in form”. (Note that one of the peculiarities of the Japanese system, from 
a Western perspective, was long supply chains held together by subcontracting of a “re-
lational” kind, blurring the exterior boundaries of large firms [Dore 1986].) Again the 
issue of dualism appeared, in that, where specialized “core” suppliers of work were in-
ternalized into the firm via long-term contracts of employment, their status contrasted 
19 Starting with Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter, and Jeffrey E. Harris. 1975. “Under-
standing the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange.” The Bell Journal of 
Economics 6 (1): 250–78.
20 How, then, are unequal contracts possible, wherein, for example, employers require workers to 
live in company towns and buy from the company shop? This, according to Williamson, can 
only be the fault of the workers, who are simply not rational enough – too emotional if not 
too human – for a capitalist world: “A chronic problem with labor market organization is that 
workers and their families are irrepressible optimists. They are taken in by vague assurances of 
good faith, by legally unenforceable promises, and by their own hopes for the good life. Tough-
minded bargaining in its entirety never occurs or, if it occurs, comes too late. An objective as-
sessment of employment hazards that should have preceded any employment agreement thus 
comes only after disappointment” (1985, 38).
Dukes, Streeck: From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? 13
starkly with the situation of “peripheral” workers transacting in a spot labour market 
where they were more exposed than ever to fluctuations in demand.
Private governance of contracting for work, the 1986 essay maintained, cannot and does 
not engender industrial citizenship. Rather than equalizing the status of sellers and buy-
ers of labour across an entire society, it gives rise to a wide variety of local and sectoral 
industrial orders shaped by local power relations and the strategic whims of manage-
ments eager to cut costs and raise profits. Status of this sort “is based not on citizen-
ship but on property rights”, rendering it “unusable as a motor for redistribution and 
redistributive justice”; in fact, it “goes hand in hand with growing social inequality …”. 
In such circumstances, “the corporatist conversion of the labour contract into a social 
contract, on the pattern of Sweden or postwar Germany and Austria, is ruled out” (70). 
The paper concludes with the question whether the new dualism, seen as penetrating 
not just into pluralist but also into corporatist labour regimes, will be a viable solution 
to the perceived competitiveness problems of Western manufacturing – and whether 
flexibility without justice, based on private ordering rather than public citizenship, will 
achieve its proclaimed objective against the Durkheimian odds: “the revitalization of 
Western capitalism for competition with its new Eastern rivals”.
4 Liberalization as emancipation?
Looking back today to the 1980s and early 1990s, the extent to which both practical 
concerns and theoretical perspectives have changed in the meantime is nothing short 
of astonishing. When the sociological and legal tradition of status and contract was in-
voked to understand the dynamics of industrial relations, labour law, and indeed capi-
talist development since the 1970s, the primary concern was still the postwar problem 
of integrating an organized working class – one that had made itself powerfully heard in 
the industrial strife of the late 1960s and thereafter – into a capitalist production system 
dependent upon class cooperation. Industrial citizenship, as defined in the tradition of 
Marshall and others, was deemed essential for this: the price to be paid by capital and 
the state in order that labour should continue to play along. None of this is pertinent 
today and nor is the issue, of overriding importance in the 1980s, of the economic 
competitiveness of Western capitalist nations in relation to each other and, above all, 
to Japan. In both respects, domestic and international, what used to be the politics of 
industrial relations has dramatically lost its significance.
Several explanations, more or less related, offer themselves for the profound de-politici-
zation of both industrial relations and the discourse regarding its legal regulation. One 
is globalization, in the form it took in the 1990s. Rather than pitching national systems 
with distinct national institutions against each other, as one might have expected in its 
early stages, globalization turned out to be, above all, a giant opportunity for capitalist 
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firms in the old industrial countries to relocate production to wherever suited them 
best.21 As a consequence, production chains came to cross national boundaries in a 
major way. Comparison between Japan and China is instructive here: the Asian com-
petitor of the 1980s and its counterpart and successor since the 1990s. Whereas Japan 
confronted Western capitalism with a distinct and compact production system of its 
own, China grew into an industrial power as a place for Western firms to “make or buy”– 
to set up plants to produce components for their products, or to rely on Chinese firms 
as subcontractors. In either case, they were by and large free to experiment with work 
and production regimes of their own choosing, unrestrained by national institutions of 
industrial citizenship, either at home or in their host country. 
Especially where it involved the relocation of production in whatever form, globaliza-
tion increased the power of internationalizing firms in their home labour markets and 
societies. One result was a dramatic decline in trade union membership and union-led 
strikes reinforced by successful government efforts to suppress inflation, which limited 
the capacity of unions to strike for high wage increases without risking unemployment 
(Tables 1, 2, and 2a).22
Another factor weakening postwar industrial citizenship was de-industrialization, which 
was accelerated by globalization. In its course, large production plants disappeared or 
were continuously downsized, partially solving the problem that Fox and others had 
in mind when they wrote about the need for concessions to workers to motivate them 
to cooperate within a Taylorist work organization intended and designed to function 
without such motivation.23 Now, in a shrinking manufacturing sector, integrating the 
21 The turning point was when, according to Rodrik, globalization changed into hyperglobaliza-
tion – in other words, where international trade ceased to be a search for comparative advan-
tage among different countries, as in Ricardo, but the building up of global production chains 
governed by global firms, in a unified world without national borders. Historically this coin-
cided with the demise of the Soviet Union after 1989 and the replacement of GATT with the 
WTO, with China as a member, envisaging one world without borders as a hunting ground for 
American multinationals under US protection. Hyperglobalization was accompanied by the fi-
nancialization of the American national economy and the attempt to compensate the American 
working class for its job losses with cheap imported consumer goods, in what has come to be 
called the Walmart economy. See Danni Rodrik. 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Why Global 
Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and his article 
“The Great Globalization Lie”, Prospect, No. 226, January 2018.
22 Table 1 shows a general decline over the past three decades in trade union membership for 
seven more or less representative “Western” countries. Density ratios for women have mostly 
also declined and, apart from Sweden, remained below male densities. The same applies to trade 
union organization in the new sectors of “commercial services”. Table 2 documents the steep de-
cline in the incidence of strikes (and lockouts) since the 1970s, to a level where labour conflicts 
have become almost a thing of the past in many countries (see Table 2a).
23 “Intended and designed” are the crucial concepts here. Frederick Winslow Taylor’s “industrial 
engineering” promised employers an organizational technology that would free them from any 
need to reach any kind of understanding with workers, not even semantic. Taylor’s world fea-
tured the huge factories of the American East Coast in the early twentieth century that em-
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ployed German and Italian immigrants in large number, who were not expected to understand 
the civilized language of English. Work processes therefore had to be arranged – i. e., broken 
up into extremely simplified, standardized, and repetitive bodily movements – so as to make 
communication between workers and managers unnecessary. The unattained ideal of “indus-
trial engineering” was training apes instead of humans to do the work. Subsequent critique of 
Taylorism discovered that no factory could work on strictly Taylorist prescription since even 
workers had to be treated as human beings, if only because they were capable of sabotaging the 
workflow if they were not, and also because task descriptions necessarily contained gaps that 
needed to be filled by workers interpreting them in good faith. Some critics recommended be-
ing nicer to workers, for example by painting the walls of workshops in bright colours, while 
others advocated various forms of power sharing with workers and trade unions, intended to 
make workers more cooperative by giving them some kind of voice regarding their work.
All workers
1990 2005 2018
France 10,7 8,6 8,8
Germany 31,2 21,5 16,5
Italy 38,7 33,3 34,4
Netherlands 24,6 21,0 16,4
Sweden 80,1 75,7 64,9
UK 39,6 27,0 23,4
USA 15,5 12,0 10,1
Women
c. 1990 c. 2005 c. 2018
France n.d. 9,8 n.d.
Germany 25,5 14,3 12,9
Italy n.d. 31,2 28,1
Netherlands 18,0 14,3 15,0
Sweden 84,8 73,2 69,6
UK 31,5 29,6 26,2
USA 12,3 10,8 9,9
Commercial Services
c. 1990 c. 2005 c. 2018
France 11,5 8,6 10,0
Germany n.d. 17,1 10,9
Italy 32,8 24,0 23,5
Netherlands 12,6 17,1 12,7
Sweden 64,2 64,0 60,0
UK 25,6 17,8 13,2
USA 9,5 7,7 5,5
Commercial services include trade and commerce; hotels, restaurants and 
catering; transport and communication; banking and insurance; business 
services and real estate.
 Time-series on women and commercial services had a substantial number 
of missing observations in the years of interest. This has been solved by us-
ing observations from adjacent years, usually between one and three years 
before or after the year of interest.
Source: Jelle Visser, ICTWSS Data base. Version 6.1. Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), October2019.
Table 1 Trade union organization in seven countries, 1990–2018
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remaining workforce into the firm as an imagined productive community became much 
less expensive for employers than had previously been imagined: the mere possibility of 
relocation or downsizing was often enough to ensure a level of engagement, if not trust, 
sufficient for the performance of work tasks in something resembling good faith.
What does the contract/status distinction tell us about changes in working relations 
in the meantime? As a first step towards addressing that question, we suggest in what 
follows that the traditional framework of industrial relations and industrial sociology 
presented in the paper requires to be revised in a number of respects, especially as it 
relates to contracting for work. 
A closer, more detailed, and less stylized look at the legal institutions in question reveals, 
first, the manner in which the industrial relations perspective of the 1980s underesti-
mated the attraction of contract compared to status – the attraction, to be more precise, 
of contracting “freely”, without the external imposition of the kind of rights and obliga-
Table 2 Average number of days not worked due to strikes and lockouts in seven countries, 
five-year periods, 1971–2015
France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden UK USA
1971–1975 3,861,325 1,246,561 20,874,175 164,432 256,884 13,083,800 23,586,840
1976–1980 2,653,081 1,090,026 19,221,692 126,468 931,241 12,853,800 22,049,440
1981–1985 1,411,260 1,153,289 11,125,450 95,258 156,666 9,374,000 11,801,640
1986–1990 700,265 113,425 4,636,393 67,319 534,973 3,039,800 8,633,320
1991–1995 530,380 553,760 2,683,280 193,066 183,876 526,200 4,669,220
1996–2000 400,064 51,339 1,097,840 28,080 33,122 512,200 7,383,320
2001–2005 624,991 113,914 1,890,826 91,340 131,065 695,240 1,650,700
2006–2010 1,437,260 187,643 735,714 45,320 40,813 674,992 1,266,560
2011–2015 472,378 310,479 n.d. 69,860 14,803 608,100 676,220
For some five-year periods, there are fewer than five observations available. Where there are four or three 
data points, averages are calculated on these years only. In the one case where there are fewer than three 
data points (Italy 2011–2015), no average was calculated (n. d.).
For France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, ILOSTAT provides separate time-series for different 
periods between 1971 and 2015, which draw on different primary data sources. 
Source: ILOSTAT, Work stoppages. United States 1971–1973: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 2a  Average number of days not worked due to strikes and lockouts in seven countries,
 five-year periods, 1971–2015, 1971–1975 = 100
France Germany Italy Nether-
lands
Sweden UK USA Summary 
index
1971–1975 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1976–1980 69 87 92 77 363 98 93 93
1981–1985 37 93 53 58 61 72 50 56
1986–1990 18 9 22 41 208 23 37 28
1991–1995 14 44 13 117 72 4 20 15
1996–2000 10 4 5 17 13 4 31 15
2001–2005 16 9 9 56 51 5 7 8
2006–2010 37 15 4 28 16 5 5 7
2011–2015 12 25 n.d. 42 6 5 3 4
The summary index was calculated by taking the average strike days of the seven countries in each five-year 
period (for six countries in 2011–2015) and transforming the resulting into an index.
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tions constitutive of status. Rather than being invented, as it were ex post, as a political 
and civilizational remedy to the asymmetry of contract in capitalist labour markets, 
status in fact predated the advent of capitalism in the form of the master-servant rela-
tion. This was noted, as we have seen, by Fox, in his perceptive analysis of the functions 
and dysfunctions of Fordist-Taylorist work organization. As described in greater detail 
by Fox’s colleague Otto Kahn-Freund, pre-modern (meaning pre-twentieth century) 
labour law specified the obligations and rights of those able to avail themselves as “mas-
ters” of the labour power of “servants”, in a manner that was heavily weighted in favour 
of the former to the disadvantage of the latter (Kahn-Freund 1977; Deakin and Wilkin-
son 2005). Indeed, as late as the eighteenth century, service for some was not so very 
different to serfdom or slavery, involving a duty to serve one’s master at any time, day 
or night – a “state of subjection”, as Blackstone put it – that could endure for a year or 
several years (Kahn-Freund 1977, 516–18, 522). Seeking nonetheless to differentiate 
the position of servants from that of serfs or slaves, contemporary commentaries placed 
great emphasis on the exercise by the former of (formal) freedom of contract (Steed-
man 2009, 18). “A Servant in the Intendment of our Law seems to be such a one as by 
Agreement and retainer oweth Duty and Service to another, who therefore is called 
Master”.24 “The terms of the Covenant convey to the Master a right over the Offices of 
his servant, but I think, not over his Person”.25 When Lord Mansfield was called upon 
to decide the case of Charlotte Howe, purchased as a slave in America and brought to 
England to work as a domestic, it was precisely the lack of a contract which led him to 
conclude that she was not a servant.26 “The statute says there must be a hiring, and here 
there was no hiring at all. She does not come within the description”.27 If a contract – an 
agreement, or “hiring” – was required to create the relation of master and servant, how-
ever, it is equally the case that the nature of that relation was governed not only by the 
terms of the agreement but also, as Kahn-Freund explained, by a set of statutory and 
common law rules that were highly punitive from the perspective of the worker (Kahn-
Freund 1977). Not only slaves but also servants, then, might readily have perceived a 
transition “from status to contract” as emancipatory, a point that must be conceded to 
nineteenth-century liberal progressivism. In principle at least, contract fixed the obliga-
24 1785 text on the Law Concerning Masters and Servants, cited in Steedman 2009, 18.
25 John Taylor. 1755. Elements of the Civil Law, cited in Steedman 2009, 2.
26 The King v the Inhabitants of Thames Ditton 1785, discussed in Steedman 2009, 121–27. Like 
others purchased as slaves and brought to England, Charlotte Howe was thus curiously without 
status in the eyes of the law, since – as Lord Mansfield underlined in the famous Somerset case 
– neither the common law nor statute recognized the existence of slavery within English borders. 
In the common consciousness of the white population of England, meanwhile, the social status 
of slave was almost entirely conflated with race (Blackett 2019, 54). Note, for example, that in 
the Somerset ruling, Lord Mansfield refers to James Somerset variously as “the negro”, “the 
slave”, and “the black” (Wiecek 1974). In Howe’s case, the result was the rather circular reason-
ing that because she was a slave, there had been no hiring, and because there was no hiring, she 
could not be a servant.
27 Cited in Steedman 2009, 124. The statute referred to was the Settlement Act – Poor Relief Act 
1662 (14 Car 2 c 12) – under the terms of which a person could gain settlement within a parish 
if he or she were hired there for over a year and a day.
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tions of workers in the form of terms which circumscribed what had previously been 
general, open-ended duties to serve. In principle, it provided workers with the oppor-
tunity to agree or not to the terms offered and to enforce agreed terms against errant 
employers. As such, the contractualisation of work, based on nothing more than what 
Marshall called civil as distinguished from political or social rights, offered intrinsic 
attractions to workers well into the era when contracts for work had been embedded 
in the modern status of industrial citizenship – especially to those categories of work-
ers who were still caught in traditional master-servant-like relationships. Where, for 
example, early twentieth-century efforts at organizing domestic servants were partially 
or temporarily successful, the primary desire expressed by the workers was precisely for 
a “contract” (Delap 2011, 87ff.).
This brings us to our second point. Contrary to the conventional view, the master-ser-
vant model of employment was not straightforwardly replaced by a contractual model 
at or around the time of the industrial revolution, nor indeed at any later date. While 
working relations may have become increasingly “contractualised” during the course 
of the nineteenth century, the master and servant model continued to influence the 
nature of such relations and the law regulating them in very significant ways (Deakin 
and Wilkinson 2005). Even at the height of industrial citizenship in the mid-twentieth 
century, the characterization of the civilized wage relationship – the modern status-
supported contract of employment – as universal, and of industrial relations systems 
as consequently comprehensive, involved gross exaggeration. Neither trade unions nor 
the law were ever able, indeed ever came close to being able, to penetrate into the more 
remote corners of the economic landscape – agriculture, domestic service, construction, 
hospitality and catering – where powerful employers, unorganized workers and non-in-
dustrial ways of production stood in the way of regularizing contracting for work along 
the lines of high industrialism. In these remote and typically overlooked corners of na-
tional and sectoral labour constitutions, alternative forms of working relation survived 
which looked rather more like master and servant than industrial citizenship. In those 
sectors where industrial citizenship did become well established, it remained the case, 
moreover, that contracts of employment were by their nature incomplete, the efforts 
of trade unions to eliminate pre-modern elements of the employment relationship in 
favour of contractual specification of mutual rights and duties having met with effective 
resistance by employers. When called upon to “fill the gaps” in contracts of employment, 
courts often read into them obligations derived from the old master-servant model: 
general duties of obedience and loyalty owed by the worker to the employer (Freedland 
2015). Even today, therefore, it remains possible to detect remnants of employees’ status 
as servants in contemporary systems of labour law, not least in the very notion of a con-
tract of service, which is a widely used synonym for the contract of employment (Riley 
2016). The law implies into all such contracts some rules that accord with the notion 
of industrial citizenship – rights to a minimum wage, to paid breaks and holidays, and 
so on, and to participate collectively in some kinds of decision-making through mem-
bership of a trade union – and others that are redolent of a hierarchical relationship of 
service (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005). 
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Just as pre-modern status survives alongside or even inside modern industrial citizen-
ship, sometimes coming to the fore by imposing itself on the practical execution and 
legal interpretation of contracts for work, so the attraction of contract as a vehicle of 
personal freedom, first felt in the transition from feudalism to industrialism, also en-
dured into the Golden Age of labour market regulation and beyond. The advance of 
neoliberalism and the disintegration of industrial citizenship cannot be fully under-
stood without taking into account the possibilities for self-determination that self-em-
ployment, or entrepreneurship, was and still is widely understood to open up (Foucault 
2004/2008).28 The neoliberal liberation of contracting for work from the status of wage 
earner or industrial citizen has proven, at least in some cases, surprisingly appealing to 
workers, with the institutions of industrial citizenship seen, or portrayed, as limiting 
personal freedom, choice, and “flexibility” in daily life. The Auden poem concerning 
The Unknown Citizen comes to mind here, with its satirising of the mundane, heav-
ily regulated existence of the Fordist worker, and its concluding response to the ques-
tions, “Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd.”29 For some workers today, 
entrepreneurship seems to hold the promise of freedom, above all else: freedom from 
the routine and fixed hours of a permanent job, from the supervision and direction 
of a manager, from the obligations imposed by union membership to act, at times, in 
solidarity with other members. In return for her greatly expanded freedom of choice, of 
course, an entrepreneur must assume personal responsibility for the consequences of 
choices made or not made; for her own failings and shortcomings but also, potentially, 
for the decisions of others; or for sheer bad luck. Together with freedom in place of 
constraint comes precarity in place of security. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, industrial citizenship theory also overestimated the attractions 
of modern status for employers: the economic benefit that they might secure by con-
ceding to their workers industrial citizenship rights and a share in managerial preroga-
tive, as required by law or “voluntarily” through collective bargaining. The more power 
employers have in the labour market and the organization of work, the less they require 
industrial citizenship. With globalization and the associated weakening of trade unions 
and social welfare systems, the power imbalance has swung yet further in favour of 
employing organizations. In the expanding services sector, work can now be organized 
in a manner that ensures managerial control without creating significant opportuni-
ties for workers to sabotage the labour process, unburdening employers of the need 
to secure workers’ good will. At the same time, the absence of trade unions enables 
management not just to use economic pressures to extract compliance, but also to draw 
on workers’ intrinsic motivations for high performance in support of employer objec-
tives, both through new “scientific” methods of human resource management and the 
invitation into the labour process of what has been called a “new spirit of capitalism”: 
28 Michel Foucault. 2004/2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979, 
translated by Graham Burchill, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
29 W. H. Auden, “The Unknown Citizen”, originally published in W. H. Auden. 1940. Another Time. 
New York: Random House. 
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the re-design of work tasks to allow for, what was considered post-1968, “personal self-
realization” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2018). 
In what follows we undertake to expand upon and further substantiate our suggested 
revisions to the 1986 narration of the fate of industrial citizenship with an empirical in-
vestigation of the employment relations of four archetypal workers in the third decade 
of the twenty-first century. Before turning to the four archetypes, however, it may be 
helpful to address directly what has been assumed until now, namely the fundamental 
distinction, in modern systems of labour law, between employment and self-employ-
ment. The employee is one who works under a contract of employment, or contract of 
service, whereas the self-employed worker has a contract for services, or a series of such 
contracts with different clients. The distinction is fundamental because, typically, only 
employees are accorded employment rights, including collective or solidaristic rights 
to form and join trade unions. (In some jurisdictions, there is also an intermediary 
category of “dependent contractor” – essentially an own-account worker who works 
for one employer only for a period of time – who enjoys some but not all of the rights 
of an employee [Williams and Lapeyre 2020].) The law recognizes that the employee 
is in a position of subordination or vulnerability relative to the employing organiza-
tion and treats the self-employed worker, in contrast, as independent – economically, 
organizationally – from those with whom she contracts to work in return for money, 
and, as such, not in need of the protection of the law or union membership. Where 
parties agree a contract for work, the law performs two functions simultaneously: it 
both identifies the type of contract in question (is it a contract of service or a contract 
for services?) and it prescribes, accordingly, the functioning of that contract, injecting it 
with elements of status, or status-ordained rules (Freedland 2016b).
In labour law scholarship, there can be a tendency to treat self-employment as a residual 
category: if a worker is not an employee, she is self-employed; if it’s not a contract of 
service, then it must be a contract for services. It ought to be borne in mind, how-
ever, that self-employment is also a specific kind of legal status – albeit a rather thin 
one – meaning that some rights and obligations attach to the self-employed worker 
(and possibly also to the “employing” organization or client) by reason of her being 
self-employed.30 The legal status of self-employment and the imaginary or ideology of 
entrepreneurship are closely related conceptually and usually go hand in hand but they 
may occur in isolation of one other. An employee may be encouraged to think of herself 
as an entrepreneur, for example – to “own” the job, to “invest” in the career – or a self-
employed worker to covet employment status. Insofar as the status of self-employment, 
or employment, has its basis in contract, it becomes a matter that is, at least in principle, 
up for negotiation or contestable. In practice, employing organizations typically enjoy 
a wide freedom to draft the terms of the contract unilaterally, offering these to pro-
30 We have in mind here chiefly obligations and rights in respect of tax and social insurance; em-
ployment rights, as has been explained, are not accorded to self-employed workers. See further 
Williams and Lapeyre 2020.
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spective workers on a take it or leave it basis. That said, the context within which such 
drafting or negotiation proceeds is shaped by the law in a wide variety of ways, both 
direct and indirect.31 Particular rules might act to incentivise and facilitate the parties’ 
choice of self-employment over employment, or vice versa (Behling and Harvey 2015). 
The law might be constructed so as to give more or less weight to the explicit terms of 
an agreement over the “realities” of the corresponding working relation,32 and it might 
make it easier, or not, for a worker to contest her employer’s characterization of their 
relationship in the written contract on the basis that it is not a true reflection of those 
realities.33 Even in the case of spot contracts, then, contracting for work is never wholly 
private but always shaped, to some degree, by public institutions including, in particular, 
labour, tax, and social security law.
5 Four workers, peripheral and core
In 1939, the archetypal worker was employed by a large factory or other organization: 
in Auden’s poem by “Fudge Motors Inc.”. “Except for the War till the day he retired/ 
He worked in a factory and never got fired … Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views/
For his Union reports that he paid his dues”. Today, the world of work is greatly fis-
sured or fragmented, so that even the terms “core” and “periphery” cannot anymore be 
understood to demarcate two easily distinguishable groups. Characteristics originally 
associated with peripheral work, including prominently the short duration of contracts, 
lack of employment security, and weakness or absence of trade unions, have become 
widespread indeed, infiltrating in some cases the working relations of even those with 
multiple university degrees and professional qualifications. The subtitle for this part 
of the paper must be understood accordingly, with the contemporary significance of 
“peripheral” and “core” falling to be investigated rather than assumed. Similarly, the des-
ignation of four workers as archetypal is not intended to imply any particular represen-
tativeness in terms of the overall numbers involved. Rather, these are job types which 
seem to us to loom large in the current collective consciousness, much commented 
upon in the academic literature as well as the mainstream media and figuring in con-
temporary fiction and film. The first two, gigging and fulfilling orders in an Amazon 
warehouse, are of interest in part for their apparent novelty; the latter two, home care 
work and academia, because of ongoing changes, rapid and significant, in the organiza-
tion of the work.
31 Freedland speaks of the contract occupying a space “between agreement and regulation”: 
(Freedland 2016a, 11–18). 
32 ILO Recommendation R198 on the Employment Relationship.
33 By facilitating union membership, funding a labour inspectorate, administering a system of eas-
ily and cheaply accessible employment tribunals or labour courts.
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Gig workers 
The term gig economy is said to have been coined in 2009 by Tina Brown, the American 
journalist and newspaper and magazine editor. Over a short period of time, the people 
Brown knew had stopped having jobs and instead had “gigs”: “a bunch of free-floating 
projects, consultancies, and part-time bits and pieces they try and stitch together”.34 
While the terminology may have been novel, the phenomenon was decidedly not: “it 
used to be called piecework”.35 What was remarkable for Brown was the recent spread of 
gigging from low-paid workers to high-earning college graduates, and the degradation 
of terms and conditions that it entailed: 
For a while last year, the downsized people I know went around pretending they enjoyed the 
“freedom” and “variety” of doing “a whole lot of interesting things.” Twelve months later … ev-
eryone knows what it actually feels like, this penny-ante slog of working three times as hard for 
the same amount of money … Minus benefits, of course. (Brown 2009)
Today, the term gigging is usually reserved for platform-mediated work, meaning that 
from its original associations with live music, the definition of gig has been stretched 
to include not only the kinds of projects and consultancies referenced by Brown, but 
also single taxi journeys or food deliveries, or even the kinds of online micro-task that 
take only a minute or a few seconds to complete.36 When the most prominent platforms 
launched around a decade ago,37 they promised freedom, flexibility, and autonomy to 
workers, characterizing them explicitly as self-employed “entrepreneurs” (Ravenelle 
2017, 286–88). By commentators in business schools, the platforms were hailed as a 
truly novel form of institution, hybrids of market and hierarchy, with digital technolo-
gies facilitating the minimization of coordination costs (Sundararajan 2017, 69). As 
experience quickly revealed, however, it was not the case that platforms had invented 
a modus operandi which obviated the need for the kind of top-down control of the 
labour process, and managerial prerogative, typical of vertically integrated employing 
organizations. For Uber, TaskRabbit, and the like to function as intended, they require 
at a minimum that a sufficient number of drivers, couriers, or taskers make themselves 
available for work at the right times of day and, secondly, that those workers readily 
agree to undertake whatever gigs are assigned to them. In some cases, platforms also re-
quire that the gigs be completed in a particular way, for example, with a particular level 
of customer service. While they have not done away with the need for control and direc-
tion, however, the platforms have succeeded in minimizing or obviating their reliance 
on contractual or other legal obligations to ensure that workers perform as required. In 
part this is achieved through technological innovation, including close monitoring and 
the embedding within the app of a ratings system. At a time when weakened employ-
ment rights and rights to social welfare have significantly lessened the attractiveness of 
34 Tina Brown, “The Gig Economy”, The Daily Beast, 12 January, 2009.
35 Brown 2009; see also Dubal 2017. 
36 For a good general overview see Prassl 2018. On the novelty of gig work see Dukes 2020.
37 TaskRabbit 2008, Uber 2009, Lyft 2012, Deliveroo 2013, Foodora 2014.
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exit options for gig workers, the constant threat of “deactivation” – summary dismissal, 
by any other name – or lesser forms of punishment, such as the withholding by the 
platform of better (more lucrative) gigs, also contribute significantly to ensuring good 
behaviour.38 To orchestrate a supply of labour that is always sufficient to meet demand 
for services, meanwhile, platforms wield the promise of the award to a worker not only 
of a better rate of pay – “surge-pricing” – but of a higher rating and, consequently, bet-
ter gigs; the threat of a lower rating and poorer gigs. There is nothing transparent about 
these ratings systems, however, and of course no right of appeal for workers when they 
don’t function as promised or expected (Prassl 2019).
As the question of gig workers’ legal status has been litigated in courts around the world, 
judges have shown themselves unwilling to accept that the lack of enforceable legal or 
contractual obligations on the worker is decisive: obligations to turn up for work, for 
example – ever, or at an appointed time – and, when at work, to accept the gigs offered 
to her via the app. Instead they have tended to focus on the powers that the platform has 
in reality to direct the worker and control the manner of work, finding variously that 
workers are employees or dependent contractors rather than independent self-employed 
workers.39 Unless and until such decisions are reached by the courts, however, the oppor-
tunities for appeal exhausted, and the judgements respected by the platform in question, 
the notion of entrepreneurship performs important functions: legal functions, insofar as 
the purported self-employment of workers allows platforms to escape employment law 
and social security obligations, and to wield the threat of deactivation; and an ideologi-
cal function, serving to legitimise the expropriation of the workers’ employment rights 
(Braverman 1974). In some cases at least, gig workers internalize the platforms’ vision, 
coming to think of themselves as entrepreneurs (Dubal 2017). A sense of injustice may 
arise, accordingly, not because of the lack of employee status and non-applicability of 
employment rights, but by reason of the platform’s failure to treat the workforce as it 
ought to treat self-employed independent contractors: allowing them, for example, to 
grow their own client base and to make informed judgements about which gigs to agree 
to take on (Dubal 2017). In other cases, workers appear to view gigging essentially as a 
job like any other, resenting above all the low rates of pay (Ravenelle 2017).
Amazon warehouse workers
In Amazon warehouses across the globe, the talk is not of entrepreneurship but of hap-
py co-working by teams of associates (Bloodworth 2018).40 Everyone is an associate 
38 Cour de Cassation, Social Chamber, 4th March 2020, no. 19-13.316. 
39 See, e. g., the Cour de Cassation decision cited at fn. 38 above; Uber BV v Aslam [2018] ICR 453.
40 James Bloodworth. 2018. Hired! Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain. London: Atlantic 
Books; Jörn Boewe, and Johannes Schulten. 2017. The Long Struggle of the Amazon Employees. 
Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
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at Amazon, from the worker who walks an average of ten miles a day, criss-crossing 
a poorly heated, ill-lit, cavernous “fulfilment centre” to collect items to be sent out for 
delivery, to the multi-billionaire Jeff Bezos, founder and CEO. While television adver-
tisements offer consumers a rosy picture of a contented, smiling workforce, the work-
ers themselves are presented daily with motivational posters and management speak: 
We love coming to work and miss it when we’re not here! In fact, the mode of operation 
very closely resembles the Taylorism of an earlier era, with wearable tech and security 
guards replacing the relentless rhythm of the assembly line and ever-present foremen 
as supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms.41 In addition to providing details of which 
items to collect, warehouse workers’ handheld devices constantly monitor their speed, 
comparing them with co-workers, and recording “idle time”, including time spent on 
toilet breaks. Remote line managers offer additional instructions and admonishments 
via the devices, while security guards check bags and pockets each time the workers 
enter and leave the warehouse. 
In Amazon, as in platform-mediated gig work, a system of strict monitoring and con-
trol is underpinned by the company’s manipulation of the workers’ legal status. Despite 
their fixed hours and regular shifts, and their patent subordination to managerial con-
trol, these workers are not, for the most part, employees, but rather dependent contrac-
tors, recruited by employment agencies on casual – “zero hours” – contracts (Briken 
and Taylor 2018).42 As such, they may enjoy a limited number of employment rights (to 
a minimum wage, perhaps, or to short rest breaks during a long shift) but, crucially, do 
not have any rights to the job. They have no legal protection against unfair dismissal, 
redundancy, or temporary lay-off; no right, that is, to be offered the shifts next week that 
they were offered this, or indeed any shifts at all. Although these workers are technically 
self-employed, however, the notion of entrepreneurship plays no role here. Instead, the 
promise of employee status is used as a carrot to control the workers, together with the 
stick of the constant threat of lay-off (Bloodworth 2018; Bricken and Taylor 2018). For 
any infraction of company rules, for late arrival, or in the case of a day of absence due to 
ill health, “points” will be awarded to a worker, together with the warning that a certain 
number of points will lead them to be shown the door. To induce workers to compete 
with each other to work ever faster, meanwhile, or to take on extra shifts when labour 
is temporarily in short supply, a manager may dangle the carrot of permanent employ-
ment: the award of a “blue badge”. 
41 Thompson refers to “digital Taylorism” (2020, 302).
42 Under a so-called “zero hours” contract, the worker agrees to work in exchange for wages if and 
when work is offered but the employer does not undertake to offer any work.
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Care workers
The job of a home care worker involves visiting elderly, sick, or disabled care users in 
their own homes and assisting them with tasks such as getting washed and dressed, us-
ing the bathroom, and preparing and eating meals. While the job has not changed much 
over the years in terms of its function, there have, in England as elsewhere, been very 
significant changes to the type of contract used to hire workers and, consequently, to 
the workers’ legal status and terms and conditions (Hayes 2017).43 Until recently, home 
care workers in England tended to be employed directly by local authorities, enjoying 
the same rights as other employees, including rights to sick pay and holiday pay, and 
a measure of job security. Being under a statutory duty to provide care to those who 
need it and, at the same time, under pressure to save money, local authorities then took 
the step of contracting with private sector companies, which undertook to provide an 
equivalent care service at a much reduced cost. Given the labour-intensive nature of 
care, however, costs could only really be cut by offering the already low-paid workers 
poorer terms and conditions. By hiring them on casual or zero-hours contracts, private 
providers were able to externalise many of the costs and economic risks incurred when 
employing someone, offloading them, instead, to the worker: the costs of training, of a 
uniform, of paid time-off due to ill health or parenthood. In effect, they expropriated 
the workers’ employment rights. To ensure the flexibility that allows them to minimize 
labour costs, private providers typically went on to hire more workers than they needed, 
causing them to be hungry for shifts and, consequently, always available for work. This 
resulted in less continuity of care for care users and lower job satisfaction for workers, 
who could no longer be sure that they would continue to care for the same individuals 
over a period of time. As with gig workers and Amazon workers, care workers’ lack of 
job security created an effective barrier to the enforcement of any rights that they did 
have, contractual or statutory, for fear of losing their jobs. 
Pursuant to the Care Act 2014, the UK Government has most recently taken steps to 
individualize the sourcing of care services in England. Using a discourse of autonomy, 
independence and above all choice for the service user, it has placed an obligation on 
local authorities to create a market in care, offering individual service users a choice be-
tween different care providers. That obligation is met through the provision to those who 
qualify of a personal budget from which they can purchase care services. According to 
the logic of the market, the interests of the service user and the care worker are thereby 
thrown into conflict as, respectively, the purchaser and vendor of care services. Relations 
between workers take the form of competition between sellers, each trying to make a 
sale; willing, perhaps, to forego the protections of health and safety law or minimum 
43 Lydia Hayes. 2017. Stories of Care: A Labour of Law. London: Palgrave Macmillan. See also 
Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein. 2012. Caring for America: Home Health Workers in the Shadow 
of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Linda Moberg. 2017. “Marketisation of 
Nordic Eldercare – Is the Model Still Universal?” Journal of Social Policy 46 (3): 603–21; Kaye 
Broadbent. 2014. “ ‘I’d rather work in a supermarket’: privatization of home care work in Japan.” 
Work, Employment and Society 28 (5): 702–17.
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wage standards if this is what it takes to secure a contract. Under the resultant legal re-
gime, workers may be employed directly by service users, they may be self-employed, or 
they may work for a private care provider. If they are self-employed, employment rights 
will not apply to them; if they are casual workers, they are unlikely to attempt to enforce 
those few rights that they have for fear of losing shifts. If they are employed directly by 
a service user, employment rights will be almost impossible to enforce, since this would 
involve legal action against the cared-for old or disabled individual, and the payment by 
that individual of any compensation or other sum awarded by the court. 
In her empirical study of home care workers, Hayes notes the degree to which the no-
tion of “care as enterprise” – of a market in care and of the supreme importance of in-
dividual choice – may be internalized by workers (Hayes 2017, 172–73). In interviews, 
she found the workers’ own narration of their working lives to be “steeped” in the aspi-
rational language of opportunity and explicit criticisms of the old welfare service era of 
social care provision. She also noted that pride was taken by some in their own ability 
to navigate a very difficult set of circumstances so as to secure for themselves sufficient 
paid hours per week and a corresponding income. Marketization was not “done to” the 
workers, Hayes concluded, but was rather a process in which they were centrally en-
gaged, both as objects and agents (Hayes 2017, 172).
University professors
Among academic staff, we find at first glance the kind of dualism identified at the end of 
the last century between core and peripheral workers performing the same, or a simi-
lar range of, tasks and roles but under very different contractual terms and conditions 
(Streeck 1992; Gorz 1999). Within the same universities or departments, a proportion 
of the staff may be employed on contracts of employment, enjoying a relatively good 
measure of job security, even tenure, while close colleagues are hired on fixed-term or 
casual or even zero-hours contracts (Gallas 2018). The nature of contractual terms in 
any individual case may reflect academic seniority, with so-called “early career research-
ers” (ECRs) expected to complete a series of short-term or casual contracts before even-
tually landing a “permanent” post – typically at a time of life, namely their late twenties 
and early thirties, when they might also wish to start families and provide secure homes 
for them. It is also far from unknown, however, for promoted academics to be hired 
for a fixed term, or even, in extreme but not unusual cases, on a contract drafted so as 
to place upon the worker sole responsibility for securing funds, in the form of research 
grants, to pay her own salary and associated costs. In some institutions, there has been 
an increase in teaching-only academic positions designed to increase the time available 
to research “stars”, so as to further enhance both individual and institutional reputa-
tions (Brennan, Naidoo, and Franco 2017). In the US, the existence of “tenure-track” 
and “non-tenure-track” positions divides the workforce into some who will likely and 
some who may never progress from insecure to secure employment.
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For full-time non-tenure-track faculty, job security, compensation, protection of academic free-
dom and inclusion in shared governance are all inferior relative to their tenure-track colleagues. 
The chasm is even wider when comparing tenure-system faculty to part-time contingent fac-
ulty. (Atkins et al. 2018)
In higher education as elsewhere, the proliferation of different contract types has been 
driven by processes of marketization involving, in this case, the characterization of stu-
dents as consumers and the introduction, in place of common standards, goals, and ide-
als, of the logics of service provision and competition between and within particular 
institutions (Slaughter and Leslie 2001). Individual staff members have been thrown 
into competition with one another for the best (tenure-track or permanent) positions 
at the “best” universities and for the best treatment once in post: promotions and wage 
increases but also workload allocation, office and laboratory space, individual research 
budgets, and so on (Brennan, Naidoo, and Franco 2017). In line with the logic of compe-
tition, there has been a very marked increase in the use of quantification to produce as-
sessments that are easily compared and ranked (Dix et al. 2020). The rating of academic 
staff is facilitated by linking the funding of research to individual termed projects, whose 
“outputs” can be readily evaluated. Impact factors become a proxy for the quality of jour-
nals, H-indices for the accomplishments of a scholar, university rankings for the stan-
dard of education that a student may expect to receive in a particular institution and the 
type of research that might be done there. Wages and other terms and conditions are in-
creasingly individualized through the institution of performance related pay and annual 
appraisals. Performance is judged with reference to both the (quantified) “quality” and 
the quantity of outputs, to external grant “capture”, and to other quantifiable measures.
Like home care workers, academic staff should be recognized as not only the objects but 
also the agents of marketization. While some aspects of the processes at play might be 
found objectionable (the characterization of students as consumers, for example, or the 
casualization of ECRs), much is masked by a semblance of meritocracy (Young 1958). 
Those who suffer the worst terms and conditions have, it might be assumed, only them-
selves to blame. Conversely, those with the best deals and highest salaries have deserved it. 
If anyone dares to complain about his lot, his opinions may be dismissed on the basis that 
he is simply envious of those who have done better: a loser and a bad one at that. Similarly, 
long-standing notions of science as a vocation can work with rather than against mar-
ketization (Weber [1918] 1961). Notions of the scholar as an heroic figure who follows 
a calling may be internalized by scholars, with the result that they more or less readily 
submit to a “totalizing imperative” that requires them to commit themselves completely 
to their role, working evenings, weekends, holidays (Peter 2017). To complain in such 
circumstances about unfair treatment would be to demonstrate a lack of dedication.
Despite the stark inequalities that undoubtedly exist in the terms and conditions of pro-
fessors and early career researchers, tenured and non-tenured staff, it would be wrong 
to assume that the status of the better-treated “core” is that of industrial citizenship. 
As was noted in the 1986 paper, the very existence of two or more classes of worker 
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within the same organization or the same sector is at odds with egalitarian notions of 
citizenship. “Modern industrial status which is, so to speak, ‘particularized’ in a dualist 
environment loses its constitutive character of a right of citizenship, as well as its func-
tion as a mechanism of political redistribution.” It works “not against but within market 
and contract … as an outcome of interest-led individual action” (Streeck 1992, 68). It 
should also be borne in mind that while the contractual terms of core academic staff are 
likely very much more generous than those of their “junior” colleagues, the legal rights 
that they enjoy as employees have been significantly downgraded in the course of the 
past two or three decades. Across jurisdictions, employment rights have been both hol-
lowed out in terms of substance and rendered more difficult to enforce: because of the 
disappearance or weakening of trade unions, the underfunding of labour inspectorates, 
and changes to procedural rules concerning employment tribunals and lower courts. 
As employment law is increasingly sidelined, the reach of Human Resource Manage-
ment (HRM) policies and procedures has expanded to fill the gap within universities, 
as within other employing organizations, private and public sector. Employees may be 
encouraged, more or less actively, to identify fairness at work with respect for these 
policies and procedures rather than with the terms of employment law (Edelman 2016). 
A final point to note here is the extent to which marketization entails treating academ-
ic staff, and encouraging them to think of themselves, as entrepreneurs (Peter 2017). 
This is most obviously the case where scientific research has the potential to result in 
patent-protected innovations and “spin-out” profit-making companies (Slaughter and 
Leslie 2001). Across all disciplines, however, academics who lead research projects, se-
cure research funding, and hire and manage teams of ECRs and postgraduate students, 
can begin to feel themselves quite independent of the institutions which formally em-
ploy them, akin, at least in some respects, to small businesspeople. Confidence in their 
own personal marketability and capacity to find employment elsewhere may reinforce 
such impressions. It may cause them to make significant investments in “building their 
brands”; not only working unpaid overtime, spending long hours on social media, per-
sonally financing travel for work purposes, but even, perhaps, paying somebody else – a 
research assistant, copy editor, ghostwriter – to do parts of the job. 
As for early career and contingent staff, on fixed-term and casual contracts, we believe 
that it may not be as outrageous as it first seems to draw a comparison here with Ama-
zon warehouse workers. The nature of the work and the physical conditions in which 
it is carried out are of course quite incomparable; rates of pay may be too, at least on 
the face of it.44 Just as in the case of Amazon workers, however, the contracts of these 
academics are drafted so as to render them insecure or precarious, perhaps for very 
significant portions of their working lives, and so to allow both the carrot of permanent 
44 A nominally hourly rate for casualized staff may have to cover, in practice, several hours of “in-
visible labour” including teaching preparation, marking, emailing with students. See for exam-
ple UCU Glasgow. 2020. The Realties of Casualisation at Glasgow University. https://ucuglasgow.
files.wordpress.com/2020/04/ucu-glasgow-anti-casualisation-report.pdf. 
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employment or tenure and the stick of termination to be liberally wielded with the aim 
of eliciting dedicated, obedient, hard work. If you can only publish this number of ar-
ticles in journals with that impact factor, and secure a research grant of so many figures, 
you too might be awarded a blue badge.
6 Contract, status, and post-industrial justice
In 1986, the “Status and Contract” essay observed the privatization and depoliticization 
of status, as industrial citizenship was replaced by a proliferation of different arrange-
ments stipulated to a significant extent by contract and no longer by externally imposed 
rules and conditions. It described the division of workers into two groups or classes in 
terms – core and periphery – that were later commonly used to signify the fragmenta-
tion of once (broadly) unitary systems of labour law and industrial relations. In 1999, 
for example, André Gorz also referred to the emergence of a core and periphery of 
workers, but placing rather more emphasis than Streeck on what he called “corporate 
culture” and “corporate loyalty” (Gorz 1999, 36). So great were the demands placed 
upon core workers by the corporations for which they worked that their employment 
relations could usefully be characterized, in Gorz’s view, as neo-feudal: “The firm offers 
workers the kind of security monastic orders, sects and work communities provide. It 
asks them to give up everything – any other form of allegiance – in order to give them-
selves, body and soul, to the company” (1999, 36).
Twenty years later, the privatization and depoliticization of status have progressed to 
such an extent that the terms core and periphery have lost much of their currency, while 
the analogy with feudal relations appears increasingly flawed and misleading. As Otto 
Kahn-Freund pointed out many decades ago, the comparison of modern employment 
with feudalism could only ever be taken so far given the many obvious differences be-
tween the statuses – most importantly the unilateral right of the employee to quit for 
any reason, though perhaps with a requirement to give notice (Selznick 1969, 69).45 It 
remains the case today that even the most down-trodden of workers enjoys formal free-
dom of contract, which fundamentally distinguishes her, as Marshall taught us, from 
a vassal or a serf.46 Even in the case of relatively secure employees, moreover, what we 
tend to observe is not a thickening of status, as suggested by Gorz, but rather its retreat, 
as employment relations become ever more marketized (Gorz 1999).47 When heavy de-
45 Philip Selznick. 1969. Law, Society, and Industrial Justice. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 69, 
citing Otto Kahn-Freund in Karl Renner. 1949. The Institutions of Private Law and their Social 
Functions. London: Routledge, 170.
46 See fn. 4 above.
47 Gorz recognized this very clearly in his characterization of the working relations of peripheral 
workers. At the end of the chapter, he briefly remarks upon the marketization of “core” employ-
ment relations as well as peripheral (1999, 51).
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mands are made of a worker today, the expectation is that they will be met not out of 
loyalty or commitment to the employing organization but because the “experience” and 
“skills” acquired will serve to improve the worker’s cv and marketability. No promise is 
made and no expectations encouraged of employment for life, and too great a degree of 
firm-loyalty may even be taken as a marker of a lack of ambition (Gershon 2017).
To speak of the retreat of status is not, of course, to imply that it has anywhere disap-
peared entirely. Elements of status must always be present if work is to be performed 
and paid for as the parties require it; if the worker is to consent to work as the employer 
wishes and directs her to do. Claims to the contrary – for example, that the gig economy 
creates a labour market without search frictions and only minimal transaction costs: 
contracts without status – assume an undersocialized model of (monadic) social ac-
tion that has no basis in the reality of social life. As we have seen, the terms of written 
contracts may be misleading in this respect: straightforwardly “bogus” and misrepre-
sentative of the realities of the working relation, or – especially in large, bureaucratic 
organizations – supplemented by HRM rules and procedures which shape the status of 
the worker by creating and imposing their own non-contractual conditions of contract. 
Tech can also perform the function of a contractual term or the exercise of managerial 
prerogative, mandating, enforcing or ruling out certain behaviours on the part of the 
workers (Hildebrandt 2015). 
While the freedom to stipulate contract terms and shape workers’ statuses undoubtedly 
lies largely with employing organizations, it remains important to consider the agency of 
workers themselves. Even where they have little power or opportunity to influence the 
explicit terms of their contracts for work, workers can shape the rules that regulate their 
working relations through either the routine observation of those rules or, alternatively, 
acts of micro-resistance and everyday transgressions; through either the internalization 
or the rejection of the status ascribed to them by their employers (Blackett 2019, 43–45). 
In their perceptions and enactments of their employment relationships, workers may 
be influenced by interactions with co-workers, especially where such interactions occur 
on a daily basis (Dukes and Streeck 2020). In the social organization of work, particular 
understandings can arise of a just order, producing social norms and, in some cases, even 
mechanisms for their enforcement: norms concerning questions of how and when work 
should be done and who should do it, and of the desired or just boundaries between the 
commodified and non-commodified spheres of workers’ lives; of what workers will con-
sent to and what they should resist. An assertion of legal rights, statutory or contractual, 
by an individual worker may be conditional on a sense of injustice that is shared with and 
reinforced by colleagues and on the existence of social bonds at the workplace. 
While shared understandings, social norms and prevailing beliefs may engender rela-
tions of solidarity between workers, strengthening their arm to challenge aspects of 
their contracts or assigned legal statuses, they can also be discriminatory and exclu-
sionary. Especially in such circumstances, legal statuses may become bound up with 
or influenced by social statuses associated with gender, race, age, nationality, and so 
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on. In eighteenth-century England, as we have seen, the status of slave was almost en-
tirely conflated with race in the common consciousness of the white population, so that 
a black woman performing domestic service was not recognized to be a servant like 
any other, even if the law didn’t acknowledge, either, the existence of slavery within its 
borders.48 Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the gender and 
racial identity of a worker have continued to influence perceptions of the type of work 
and role to which she is best suited, such perceptions being then internalized or resisted 
by the worker herself (Glucksmann 1990). The age of a worker, too, can shape opinion 
regarding the acceptability or appropriateness of the terms and conditions of work, with 
younger workers possessing a greater readiness to suffer low pay and insecurity if they 
regard the job in question as temporary, as an opportunity to gain experience, or as the 
first rung on a “career ladder” stretching high above. Status may be understood to be 
transitional, liquid, earned through promotion and bound up with the life course; work 
careers to be long successive periods of probation, under the watchful eye of the market 
and the personnel department, the promise of a secure job with employment rights 
always just out of reach.
If we speak of privatization and private ordering in connection with employment rela-
tions, we nonetheless recognize the importance of the role of the state in facilitating, 
encouraging and even engineering the expanded power and freedom of employing or-
ganizations relative to labour, and in broader processes of economic liberalization. The 
negotiation by private actors of contracts for work is shaped in myriad ways, direct and 
indirect, by state legislation and public institutions so that not only labour laws fall to 
be investigated here but social security and tax, immigration laws, and the provision (or 
not) of childcare and other public services. The private ordering of employment rela-
tions is a matter of great public interest. Where wages sink below the cost of living, the 
public purse must make up the difference; where workers are classified as self-employed 
in ever greater number, tax revenues and social insurance funds shrink. If self-employ-
ment chimes well with the demands of workers in some sectors of the contemporary 
workforce for freedom and flexibility at work, it is also the case that it undermines se-
curity and stability for workers and in many cases provides them with little opportunity 
to engage in the entrepreneurship that they desire. 
Where there is political will to address such concerns, certain courses of action readily 
present themselves. Simple steps could be taken, for example, to make self-employment 
and other forms of contract for work more difficult for an employing organization to 
establish; easier for a worker to challenge; and anyway less attractive from an employer’s 
point of view by reason of the application thereto of obligations to pay social security 
and pension contributions (Williams and Lapeyre 2020). The law could be changed, in 
other words, to limit freedom of contract again in the field of employment relations, 
circumscribing the range of contractual arrangements available and thickening the as-
sociated statuses.
48 See footnotes 26 and 27 above, and associated text.
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The route to a full reconstruction of industrial citizenship is rather more difficult to 
chart. It is no longer as easy as it once was to demonstrate that the concession of status 
rights to workers across the board will benefit capital, integrating an organized and 
potentially disruptive working class into a system of production dependent upon class 
cooperation. Workers are for the most part unorganized; trade unions are weakened; 
means of production have been developed that are less reliant on worker cooperation, 
at least on the face of it; and where worker consent is needed, there are good reasons 
why this may be given quite willingly. In such circumstances, the single most impor-
tant objective for law reform, we believe, is to strengthen workers’ rights of freedom of 
association, extending or reimagining these rights to fit with the realities of working 
relations today. Social bonds among workers in the same occupation or workplace pro-
duce and sustain strong and enduring beliefs regarding fairness and justice at work. It 
has long been recognized, by scholars of labour law and industrial relations alike, that 
procedural rules can open up the regulation of working relations to the participation 
of workers and employers, correcting the tendency of contract law to obscure the col-
lective nature of such regulation; the important public interests at play. How this will 
happen, if at all, is not a matter of theory but of political practice: of social movements 
and collective agency.
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